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Abstract
This work addresses the problem of ensuring trustworthy computation in a linear consensus network. A solution
to this problem is relevant for several tasks in multi-agent systems including motion coordination, clock synchro-
nization, and cooperative estimation. In a linear consensus network, we allow for the presence of misbehaving
agents, whose behavior deviate from the nominal consensus evolution. We model misbehaviors as unknown and
unmeasurable inputs affecting the network, and we cast the misbehavior detection and identification problem into an
unknown-input system theoretic framework. We consider two extreme cases of misbehaving agents, namely faulty
(non-colluding) and malicious (Byzantine) agents. First, we characterize the set of inputs that allow misbehaving
agents to affect the consensus network while remaining undetected and/or unidentified from certain observing
agents. Second, we provide worst-case bounds for the number of concurrent faulty or malicious agents that can
be detected and identified. Precisely, the consensus network needs to be 2k + 1 (resp. k + 1) connected for k
malicious (resp. faulty) agents to be generically detectable and identifiable by every well behaving agent. Third,
we quantify the effect of undetectable inputs on the final consensus value. Fourth, we design three algorithms to
detect and identify misbehaving agents. The first and the second algorithm apply fault detection techniques, and
affords complete detection and identification if global knowledge of the network is available to each agent, at a high
computational cost. The third algorithm is designed to exploit the presence in the network of weakly interconnected
subparts, and provides local detection and identification of misbehaving agents whose behavior deviates more than
a threshold, which is quantified in terms of the interconnection structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems and networks have received much attention in the last years because of their flexi-
bility and computational performance. One of the most frequent tasks to be accomplished by autonomous
agents is to agree upon some parameters. Agreement variables represent quantities of interest such as the
work load in a network of parallel computers, the clock speed for wireless sensor networks, the velocity,
the rendezvous point, or the formation pattern for a team of autonomous vehicles; e.g., see [1], [2], [3].
Several algorithms achieving consensus have been proposed and studied in the computer science
community [4]. In this work, we consider linear consensus iterations, where, at each time instant, each
node updates its state as a weighted combination of its own value and those received from its neighbors
[5], [6]. The choice of algorithm weights influences the convergence speed toward the steady state value
[7].
Because of the lack of a centralized entity that monitors the activity of the nodes of the network,
distributed systems are prone to attacks and components failure, and it is of increasing importance to
guarantee trustworthy computation even in the presence of misbehaving parts [8]. Misbehaving agents
can interfere with the nominal functions of the network in different ways. In this paper, we consider two
extreme cases: that the deviations from their nominal behavior are due to genuine, random faults in the
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2agents; or that agents can instead craft messages with the purpose of disrupting the network functions.
In the first scenario, faulty agents are unaware of the structure and state of the network and ignore the
presence of other faults. In the second scenario, the worst-case assumption is made that misbehaving
agents have knowledge of the structure and state of the network, and may collude with others to produce
the biggest damage. We refer to the first case as non-colluding, or faulty; to the second case as malicious,
or Byzantine.
Reaching unanimity in an unreliable system is an important problem, well studied by computer scientists
interested in distributed computing. A first characterization of the resilience of distributed systems to
malicious attacks appears in [9], where the authors consider the task of agreeing upon a binary message
sent by a “Byzantine general,” when the communication graph is complete. In [10] the resilience of a
partially connected1 network seeking consensus is analyzed, and it is shown that the well-behaving agents
of a network can always agree upon a parameter if and only if the number of malicious agents
(i) is less than 1/2 of the network connectivity, and
(ii) is less than 1/3 of the number of processors.
This result has to be regarded as a fundamental limitation of the ability of a distributed consensus system to
sustain arbitrary malfunctioning: the presence of misbehaving Byzantine processors can be tolerated only
if their number satisfies the above threshold, independently of whatever consensus protocol is adopted.
We consider linear consensus algorithms in which every agent, including the misbehaving ones, are
assumed to send the same information to all their neighbors. This assumption appears to be realistic
for most control scenarios. In a sensing network for instance, the data used in the consensus protocol
consist of the measurements taken directly by the agents, and (noiseless) measurements regarding the same
quantity coincide. Also, in a broadcast network, the information is transmitted using broadcast messages,
so that the content of a message is the same for all the receiving nodes. The problem of characterizing the
resilience properties of linear consensus strategies has been partially addressed in recent works [11], [12],
[13], where, for the malicious case, it is shown that, despite the limited abilities of the misbehaving agents,
the resilience to external attacks is still limited by the connectivity of the network. In [11] the problem
of detecting and identifying misbehaving agents in a linear consensus network is first introduced, and a
solution is proposed for the single faulty agent case. In [12], [13], the authors provide one policy that
k malicious agents can follow to prevent some of the nodes of a 2k-connected network from computing
the desired function of the initial state, or, equivalently, from reaching an agreement. On the contrary, if
the connectivity is 2k + 1 or more, then the authors show that generically the set of misbehaving nodes
is identified independent of its behavior, so that the desired consensus is eventually reached.
The main differences between this paper and the references [12], [13] are as follows. First, the method
proposed in [12], [13] takes inspiration from parity space methods for fault detection, while, following our
early work [11], we adopt here unknown-input observers techniques [14]. Second, we focus on consensus
networks, and we derive specific results for this important case that cannot be assessed for general linear
iterations. Third, we consider two different types of misbehaving agents, namely malicious and faulty
agents, and we provide network resilience bounds for both cases. Fourth, we exhaustively characterize
the complete set of policies that make a set of k agents undetectable and/or unidentifiable, as opposed to
[12] where only a particular disrupting strategy is defined. Fifth, we study system theoretic properties of
consensus systems (e.g., detectability, stabilizability, left-invertibility), and we quantify the effect of some
misbehaving inputs on the network performance. Finally, we address the problem of detection complexity
and we propose a computationally efficient detection method, as opposed to combinatorial procedures.
Our approach also differs from the existing computer science literature, e.g., our analysis leads to the
development of algorithms that can be easily extended to work on both discrete and continuous time
linear consensus networks, and also with partial knowledge of the network topology.
The main contributions of this work are as follows. By recasting the problem of linear consensus
computation in an unreliable system into a system theoretic framework, we provide alternative and
1The connectivity of a graph is the maximum number of disjoint paths between any two vertices of the graph. A graph is complete if it
has connectivity n− 1, where n is the number of vertices in the graph.
3constructive system-theoretic proofs of existing bounds on the number of identifiable misbehaving agents
in a linear network, i.e., k Byzantine agents can be detected and identified if the network is (2k + 1)-
connected, and they cannot be identified if the network is 2k-connected or less. Moreover, by showing
some connections between linear consensus networks and linear dynamical systems, we exhaustively
describe the strategies that misbehaving nodes can follow to disrupt a linear network that is not sufficiently
connected. In particular, we prove that the inputs that allow the misbehaving agents to remain undetected
or unidentified coincide with the inputs-zero of a linear system associated with the consensus network. We
provide a novel and comprehensive analysis on the detection and identification of non-colluding agents.
We show that k faulty agents can be identified if the network is (k + 1)-connected, and cannot if the
network is k-connected or less. For both the cases of Byzantine and non-colluding agents, we prove
that the proposed bounds are generic with respect to the network communication weights, i.e., given an
(unweighted) consensus graph, the bounds hold for almost all (consensus) choices of the communication
weights. In other words, if we are given a (k+ 1)-connected consensus network for which k faulty agents
cannot be identified, then a random and arbitrary small change of the communication weights (within the
space of consensus weights) make the misbehaving agents identifiable with probability one. In the last
part of the paper, we discuss the problem of detecting and identifying misbehaving agents when either
the partial knowledge of the network or hardware limitations make it impossible to implement an exact
identification procedure. We introduce a notion of network decentralization in terms of relatively weakly
connected subnetworks. We derive a sufficient condition on the consensus matrix that allows to identify a
certain class of misbehaving agents under local network model information. Finally, we describe a local
algorithm to promptly detect and identify corrupted components.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly recalls some basic facts on the geometric
approach to the study of linear systems, and on the fault detection and isolation problem. In Section III
we model linear consensus networks with misbehaving agents. Section IV presents the conditions under
which the misbehaving agents are detectable and identifiable. In Section V we characterize the effect
of an unidentifiable attack on the network consensus state. In Section VI we show that the resilience
of linear consensus networks to failures and external attacks is a generic property with respect to the
consensus weights. In Section VII we present our algorithmic procedures. Precisely we derive an exact
identification algorithm, and an approximate and low-complexity procedure. Finally, Sections VIII and IX
contain respectively our numerical studies and our conclusion.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
We adopt the same notation as in [15]. Let n,m, p ∈ N, let A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, and C ∈ Rp×n. Let
the triple (A,B,C) denote the linear discrete time system
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t),
y(t) = Cx(t),
(1)
and let the subspaces B ⊆ Rn×n and C ⊆ Rn×n denote the image space Im(B) and the null space Ker(C),
respectively. A subspace V ⊆ Rn×n is a (A,B)-controlled invariant if AV ⊆ V + B, while a subspace
S ⊆ Rn×n is a (A, C)-conditioned invariant if A(S∩C) ⊆ S. The set of all controlled invariants contained
in C admits a supremum, which we denote with V∗, and which corresponds to the locus of all possible
state trajectories of (1) invisible at the output. On the other hand, the set of the conditioned invariants
containing B admits an infimum, which we denote with S∗. Several problems, including disturbance
decoupling, non interacting control, fault detection and isolation, and state estimation in the presence of
unknown inputs have been addressed and solved in a geometric framework [15], [16].
In the classical Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) setup, the presence of sensor failures and actuator
malfunctions is modeled by adding some unknown and unmeasurable functions ui(t) to the nominal
system. The FDI problem is to design, for each failure i, a filter of the form
wi(t+ 1) = Fiwi(t) + Eiy(t),
ri(t) = Miw(t) +Hiy(t),
(2)
4also known as residual generator, that takes the observables y(t) and generates a residual vector ri(t)
that allows to uniquely identify if ui(t) becomes nonzero, i.e., if the failure i occurred in the system.
Let B1, . . . , Bm be the input matrices of the failure functions u1, . . . , um. As a result of [15], [17], the
i-th failure can be correctly identified if and only if Bi ∩ (V∗K\{i} + S∗K\{i}) = ∅, where V∗K\{i} andS∗K\{i} are the maximal controlled and minimal conditioned invariant subspaces associated with the triple
(A, [B1 · · ·Bi−1 Bi+1 · · ·Bm], C). It can be shown that, under the above solvability condition, the filter
(2) can be designed as a dead beat device to have finite convergence time [17]: this property will be used
in Section VII for the characterization of our intrusion detection algorithm. We remark that, although the
FDI problem does not coincide with the problem we are going to face, we will be using some standard
FDI techniques to design our detection and identification algorithms, and we refer the reader to [14] for
a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
III. LINEAR CONSENSUS IN THE PRESENCE OF MISBEHAVING AGENTS
Let G denote a directed graph with vertex set V = {1, . . . , n} and edge set E ⊂ V × V , and recall
that the connectivity of G is the maximum number of disjoint paths between any two vertices of the
graph, or, equivalently, the minimum number of vertices in a vertex cutset [18]. The neighbor set of a
node i ∈ V , i.e., all the nodes j ∈ V such that the pair (j, i) ∈ E, is denoted with Ni. We let each vertex
j ∈ V denote an autonomous agent, and we associate a real number xj with each agent j. Let the vector
x ∈ Rn contain the values xj . A linear iteration over G is an update rule for x and is described by the
linear discrete time system
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t), (3)
where the (i, j)-th entry of A is nonzero only if (j, i) ∈ E. If the matrix A is row stochastic and primitive,
then, independent of the initial values of the nodes, the network asymptotically converges to a configuration
in which the state of the agents coincides. In the latter case, the matrix A is referred to as a consensus
matrix, and the system (3) is called consensus system. The graph G is referred to as the communication
graph associated with the consensus system (3) or, equivalently, with the consensus matrix A. A detailed
treatment of the applications, and the convergence aspects of the consensus algorithm is in [1], [2], [3],
and in the references therein.
We allow for some agents to update their state differently than specified by the matrix A by adding an
exogenous input to the consensus system. Let ui(t), i ∈ V , be the input associated with the i-th agent,
and let u(t) be the vector of the functions ui(t). The consensus system becomes x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +u(t).
Definition 1 (Misbehaving agent) An agent j is misbehaving if there exists a time t ∈ N such that
uj(t) 6= 0.
In Section IV we will give a precise definition of the distinction, made already in the Introduction, between
faulty and malicious agents on the basis of their inputs.
Let K = {i1, i2, . . . } ⊆ V denote a set of misbehaving agents, and let BK = [ei1 ei2 · · · ], where ei is
the i-th vector of the canonical basis. The consensus system with misbehaving agents K reads as
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +BKuK(t). (4)
As it is shown in [11], algorithms of the form (3) have no resilience to malfunctions, and the presence of
a misbehaving agent may prevent the entire network from reaching consensus. As an example, let c ∈ R,
and let ui(t) = −Aix(t) + c, being Ai the i-th row of A. After reordering the variables in a way that the
well-behaving nodes come first, the consensus system can be rewritten as
x˜(t+ 1) =
[
Q R
0 1
]
x˜(t), (5)
5where the matrix Q corresponds to the interaction among the nodes V \{i}, while R denotes the connection
between the sets V \ {i} and {i}. Recall that a matrix is said to be Schur stable if all its eigenvalues lie
in the open unit disk.
Lemma III.1 (Quasi-stochastic submatrices) Let A be an n×n consensus matrix, and let J be a proper
subset of {1, . . . , n}. The submatrix with entries Ai,k, i, k ∈ J , is Schur stable.
Proof: Reorder the nodes such that the indexes in J come first in the matrix A. Let AJ be the leading
principal submatrix of dimension |J |. Let A˜J =
[
AJ 0
0 0
]
, where the zeros are such that A˜J is n× n, and
note that ρ(AJ) = ρ(A˜J), where ρ(AJ) denotes the spectral radius of the matrix AJ [19]. Since A is a
consensus matrix, it has only one eigenvalue of unitary modulus, and ρ(A) = 1. Moreover, A ≥ |A˜J |,
and A 6= |A˜J |, where |A˜J | is such that its (i, j)-th entry equals the absolute value of the (i, j)-th entry
of A˜J , ∀i, j. It is known that ρ(AJ) ≤ ρ(A) = 1, and that if equality holds, then there exists a diagonal
matrix D with nonzero diagonal entries, such that A = DA˜JD−1 [19, Wielandt’s Theorem]. Because A
is irreducible, there exists no diagonal D with nonzero diagonal entries such that A = DA˜JD−1 and the
statement follows.
Because of Lemma III.1, the matrix Q in (5) is Schur stable, so that the steady state value of the
well-behaving agents in (5) depends upon the action of the misbehaving node, and it corresponds to
(I − Q)−1Rc. In particular, since (I − Q)−1R = [1 · · · 1]T, a single misbehaving agent can steer the
network towards any consensus value by choosing the constant c.2
It should be noticed that a different model for the misbehaving nodes consists in the modification of the
entries of A corresponding to their incoming communication edges. However, since the resulting network
evolution can be obtained by properly choosing the input uK(t) and letting the matrix A fixed, our model
does not limit generality, while being convenient for the analysis. For the same reason, system (4) also
models the case of defective communication edges. Indeed, if the edge from the node i to the node j is
defective, then the message received by the agent j at time t is incorrect, and hence also the state xj(t¯),
t¯ ≥ t. Since the values xj(t¯) can be produced with an input uj(t), the failure of the edge (i, j) can be
regarded as the j-th misbehaving action. Finally, the following key difference between our model and the
setup in [10] should be noticed. If the communication graph is complete, then up to n − 1 (instead of
bn/3c) misbehaving agents can be identified in our model by a well-behaving agent. Indeed, since with
a complete communication graph the initial state x(0) is correctly received by every node, the consensus
value is computed after one communication round, so that the misbehaving agents cannot influence the
dynamics of the network.
IV. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF MISBEHAVING AGENTS
The problem of ensuring trustworthy computation among the agents of a network can be divided into
a detection phase, in which the presence of misbehaving agents is revealed, and an identification phase,
in which the identity of the intruders is discovered. A set of misbehaving agents may remain undetected
from the observations of a node j if there exists a normal operating condition under which the node
would receive the same information as under the perturbation due to the misbehavior. To be more precise,
let Cj = [en1 . . . enp ]
T, {n1, . . . , np} = Nj , denote the output matrix associated with the agent j, and
let yj(t) = Cjx(t) denote the measurements vector of the j-th agent at time t. Let x(x0, u¯, t) denote
the network state trajectory generated from the initial state x0 under the input sequence u¯(t), and let
yj(x0, u¯, t) be the sequence measured by the j-th node and corresponding to the same initial condition
and input.
2If the misbehaving input is not constant, then the network may not achieve consensus. In particular, the effect of a misbehaving input
uK on the network state at time t is given by
∑t
τ=0A
t−τBKuK(τ) (see also Section V).
6Definition 2 (Undetectable input) For a linear consensus system of the form (4), the input uK(t) intro-
duced by a set K of misbehaving agents is undetectable if
∃x1, x2 ∈ Rn, j ∈ V : ∀t ∈ N, yj(x1, uK , t) = yj(x2, 0, t).
A more general concern than detection is identifiability of intruders, i.e. the possibility to distinguish
from measurements between the misbehaviors of two distinct agents, or, more generally, between two
disjoint subsets of agents. Let K ⊂ 2V contain all possible sets of misbehaving agents.3
Definition 3 (Unidentifiable input) For a linear consensus system of the form (4) and a nonempty set
K1 ∈ K, an input uK1(t) is unidentifiable if there exist K2 ∈ K, with K1 6= K2, and an input uK2(t) such
that
∃x1, x2∈ Rn, j ∈ V :∀t ∈ N, yj(x1, uK1 , t) = yj(x2, uK2 , t).
Of course, an undetectable input is also unidentifiable, since it cannot be distinguished from the zero
input. The converse does not hold. Unidentifiable inputs are a very specific class of inputs, to be precisely
characterized later in this section. Correspondingly, we define
Definition 4 (Malicious behaviors) A set of misbehaving agents K is malicious if its input uK(t) is
unidentifiable. It is faulty otherwise.
We provide now a characterization of malicious behaviors for the particularly important class of linear
consensus networks. Notice however that, if the matrix A below is not restricted to be a consensus matrix,
then the following Theorem extends the results in [12] by fully characterizing the inputs for which a group
of misbehaving agents remains unidentified from the output observations of a certain node.
Theorem IV.1 (Characterization of malicious behaviors) For a linear consensus system of the form
(4) and a nonempty set K1 ∈ K, an input uK1(t) is unidentifiable if and only if
CjA
t+1x¯ =
t∑
τ=0
CjA
t−τ (BK1uK1(τ)−BK2uK2(τ)) ,
for all t ∈ N, and for some uK2(t), with K2 ∈ K, K1 6= K2, and x¯ ∈ Rn. If the same holds with
uK2(t) ≡ 0, the input is actually undetectable.
Proof: By definitions 2 and 3, an input uK1(t) is unidentifiable if yj(x1, uK1 , t) = yj(x2, uK2 , t),
and it is undetectable if yj(x1, uK1 , t) = yj(x2, 0, t), for some x1, x2, and uK2(t). Due to linearity of the
network, the statement follows.
Remark 1 (Malicious behaviors are not generic) Because an unidentifiable input must satisfy the equa-
tion in Theorem IV.1, excluding pathological cases, unidentifiable signals are not generic, and they can be
injected only intentionally by colluding misbehaving agents. This motivates our definition of “malicious”
for those agents which use unidentifiable inputs. 
We consider now the resilience of a consensus network to faulty and malicious misbehaviors. Let I
denote the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions. The zero dynamics of the linear system (A,BK , Cj)
are the (nontrivial) state trajectories invisible at the output, and can be characterized by means of the
(n+ p)× (n+ |K|) pencil
P (z) =
[
zI − A BK
Cj 0
]
.
3An element of K is a subset of {1, . . . , n}. For instance, K may contain all the subsets of {1, . . . , n} with a specific cardinality.
7The complex value z¯ is said to be an invariant zero of the system (A,BK , Cj) if there exists a state-zero
direction x0, x0 6= 0, and an input-zero direction g, such that (z¯I − A)x0 + BKg = 0, and Cjx0 = 0.
Also, if rank(P (z)) = n + |K| for all but finitely many complex values z, then the system (A,BK , Cj)
is left-invertible, i.e., starting from any initial condition, there are no two distinct inputs that give rise
to the same output sequence [20]. We next characterize the relationship between the zero dynamics of a
consensus system and the connectivity of the consensus graph.
Lemma IV.1 (Zero dynamics and connectivity) Given a k-connected linear network with matrix A,
there exists a set of agents K1, with |K1| > k, and a node j such that the consensus system (A,BK1 , Cj)
is not left-invertible. Furthermore, there exists a set of agents K2, with |K2| = k, and a node j such that
the system (A,BK2 , Cj) has nontrivial zero dynamics.
Proof: Let G be the digraph associated with A, and let k be the connectivity of G. Take a set K of
k+ 1 misbehaving nodes, such that k of them form a vertex cut S of G. Note that, since the connectivity
of G is k, such a set always exists. The network G is divided into two subnetworks G1 and G3, which
communicate only through the nodes S. Assume that the misbehaving agent K \ S belongs to G3, while
the observing node j belongs to G1. After reordering the nodes such that the vertices of G1 come first,
the vertices S come second, and the vertices of G3 come third, the consensus matrix A is of the form[
A11 A12 0
A21 A22 A23
0 A32 A33
]
, where the zero matrices are due to the fact that S is a vertex cut. Let uS(t) = −A23x3(t),
where x3 is the vector containing the values of the nodes of G3, and let uK\S(t) be any arbitrary nonzero
function. Clearly, starting from the zero state, the values of the nodes of G1 are constantly 0, while the
subnetwork G3 is driven by the misbehaving agent K \ S. We conclude that the triple (A,BK , Cj) is not
left-invertible.
Suppose now that K ≡ S as previously defined, and let uK(t) = −A23x3(t). Let the initial condition
of the nodes of G1 and of S be zero. Since every state trajectory generated by x3 6= 0 does not appear in
the output of the agent j, the triple (A,BK , Cj) has nontrivial zero dynamics.
Following Lemma IV.1, we next state an upper bound on the number of misbehaving agents that can
be detected.
Theorem IV.2 (Detection bound) Given a k-connected linear consensus network, there exist undetectable
inputs for a specific set of k misbehaving agents.
Proof: Let K , with |K| = k, be the misbehaving set, and let K form a vertex cut of the consensus
network. Because of Lemma IV.1, for some output matrix Cj , the consensus system has nontrivial zero
dynamics, i.e., there exists an initial condition x(0) and an input uK(t) such that yj(t) = 0 at all times.
Hence, the input uK(t) is undetectable from the observations of j.
We now consider the identification problem.
Theorem IV.3 (Identification of misbehaving agents) For a set of misbehaving agents K1 ∈ K, every
input is identifiable from j if and only if the consensus system (A, [BK1 BK2 ], Cj) has no zero dynamics
for every K2 ∈ K.
Proof: (Only if) By contradiction, let x0 and [uTK1 −uTK2 ]T be a state-zero direction, and an input-zero
sequence for the system (A, [BK1 BK2 ], Cj). We have
yj(t) = 0 = Cj
(
Atx0 +
t−1∑
τ=0
At−τ−1
(
BK1uK1(τ)−BK2uK2(τ)
))
.
Therefore,
Cj
(
Atx10 +
t−1∑
τ=0
At−τ−1BK1uK1(τ)
)
= Cj
(
Atx20 +
t−1∑
τ=0
At−τ−1BK2uK2(τ)
)
,
8where x10−x20 = x0. Clearly, since the output sequence generated by K1 coincide with the output sequence
generated by K2, the two inputs are unidentifiable.
(If) Suppose that, for any K2 ∈ K, the system (A[BK1 BK2 ]) has no zero dynamics, i.e., there exists no
initial condition x0 and input [uTK1 u
T
K2
]T that result in the output being zero at all times. By the linearity
of the network, every input uK1 is identifiable.
As a consequence of Theorem IV.3, if up to k misbehaving agents are allowed to act in the network,
then a necessary and sufficient condition to correctly identify the set of misbehaving nodes is that the
consensus system subject to any set of 2k inputs has no nontrivial zero dynamics.
Theorem IV.4 (Identification bound) Given a k-connected linear consensus network, there exist uniden-
tifiable inputs for a specific set of bk−1
2
c+ 1 misbehaving agents.
Proof: Since 2(bk−1
2
c+ 1) ≥ k, by Lemma IV.1 there exist K1, K2, with |K1| = |K2| = bk−12 c+ 1,
and j such that the system (A, [BK1 BK2 ], Cj) has nontrivial zero dynamics. By Theorem IV.3, there
exists an input and an initial condition such that K1 is undistinguishable from K2 to the agent j.
In other words, in a k-connected network, at most k − 1 (resp. bk−1
2
c) misbehaving agents can be
certainly detected (resp. identified) by every agent. Notice that, for a linear consensus network, Theorem
IV.4 provides an alternative proof of the resilience bound presented in [10] and in [12].
We now focus on the faulty misbehavior case. Notice that, because such agents inject only identifiable
inputs by definition, we only need to guarantee the existence of such inputs. We start by showing that,
independent of the cardinality of a set K, there exist detectable inputs for a consensus system (A,BK , Cj),
so that any set of faulty agents is detectable. By using a result from [21], an input uK(t) is undetectable
from the measurements of the j-th agent only if for all t ∈ N, it holds CjAvBKuK(t) = CjAv+1x(t),
where CjAvBK is the first nonzero Markov parameter, and x(t) is the network state at time t. Notice that,
because of the irreducibility assumption of a consensus matrix, independently of the cardinality of the
faulty set and of the observing node j, there exists a finite v such that CjAvBK 6= 0, so that every input
uK(t) 6= (CjAvBK)†CjAv+1x(t) is detectable. We show that, if the number of misbehaving components
is allowed to equal the connectivity of the consensus network, then there exists a set of misbehaving
agents that are unidentifiable independent of their input.
Theorem IV.5 (Identification of faulty agents) Given a k-connected linear consensus network, there
exists no identifiable input for a specific set of k misbehaving agents
Proof: Let K1, with |K1| = k, form a vertex cut. The network is divided into two subnetworks G1
and G2 by the agents K1. Let K2, with |K2| ≤ k, be the set of faulty agents, and suppose that the set K2
belongs to the subnetwork G2. Let j be an agent of G1. Notice that, because K1 forms a vertex cut, for
every initial condition x(0) and for every input uK2(t), there exists an input uK1(t) such that the output
sequences at the node j coincide. In other words, every input uK2(t) is unidentifiable.
Hence, in a k-connected network, a set of k faulty agents may remain unidentified independent of its
input function. It should be noticed that Theorems IV.4 and IV.5 only give an upper bound on the maximum
number of concurrent misbehaving agents that can be detected and identified. In Section VI it will be
shown that, generically, in a k-connected network, there exists only identifiable inputs for any set of bk−1
2
c
misbehaving agents, and that there exist some identifiable inputs for any set of k− 1 misbehaving agents.
In other words, if there exists a set of misbehaving nodes that cannot be identified by an agent, then,
provided that the connectivity of the communication graph is sufficiently high, a random and arbitrarily
small change of the consensus matrix makes the misbehaving nodes detectable and identifiable with
probability one.
V. EFFECTS OF UNIDENTIFIED MISBEHAVING AGENTS
In the previous section, the importance of zero dynamics in the misbehavior detection and identification
problem has been shown. In particular, we proved that a misbehaving agent may alter the nominal network
9behavior while remaining undetected by injecting an input-zero associated with the current network state.
We now study the effect of an unidentifiable attack on the final consensus value. As a preliminary result,
we prove the detectability of a consensus network.
Lemma V.1 (Detectability) Let the matrix A be row stochastic and irreducible. For any network node
j, the pair (A,Cj) is detectable.
Proof: If A is stochastic and irreducible, then it has at least h ≥ 1 eigenvalues of unitary modulus.
Precisely, the spectrum of A contains {1 = eiθ0 , eiθ1 , . . . , eiθh−1}. By Wielandt’s theorem [19], we have
ADk = e
iθkDkA, where k ∈ {0, . . . , h− 1}, and Dk is a full rank diagonal matrix. By multiplying both
sides of the equality by the vector of all ones, we have ADk1 = eiθkDkA1 = eiθkDk1, so that Dk1 is the
eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue eiθk . Observe that the vector Dk1 has no zero component, and
that, by the eigenvector test [20], the pair (A,Cj) is detectable. Indeed, since A is irreducible, the neighbor
set Nj is nonempty, and the eigenvector Dk1, with k ∈ {0, . . . , h− 1}, is not contained in Ker(Cj).
Observe that the primitivity of the network matrix is not assumed Lemma V.1. By duality, a result on
the stabilizability of the pair (A,Bj) can also be asserted.
Lemma V.2 (Stabilizability) Let the matrix A be row stochastic and irreducible. For any network node
j, the pair (A,Bj) is stabilizable.
Remark 2 (State estimation via local computation) If a linear system is detectable (resp. stabilizable),
then a linear observer (resp. controller) exists to asymptotically estimate (resp. stabilize) the system state.
By combining the above results with Lemma III.1, we have that, under a mild assumption on the matrix
A, the state of a linear network can be asymptotically observed (resp. stabilized) via local computation.
Consider for instance the problem of designing an observer [15], and let Cj = eTj . Take G = −Aj , where
Aj denotes the j-th column of A. Notice that the matrix A + GCj can be written as a block-triangular
matrix, and it is stable because of Lemma III.1. Finally, since the nonzero entries of G correspond to the
out-neighbors4 of the node j, the output injection operation GCj only requires local information. 
A class of undetectable attacks is now presented. Notice that misbehaving agents can arbitrarily change
their initial state without being detected during the consensus iterations, and, by doing so, misbehaving
components can cause at most a constant error on the final consensus value. Indeed, let A be a consensus
matrix, and let K be the set of misbehaving agents. Let x(0) be the network initial state, and suppose that
the agents K alter their initial value, so that the network initial state becomes x(0)+BKc, where c ∈ R|K|.
Recall from [19] that limt→∞At = 1pi, where 1 is the vector of all ones, and pi is such that piA = pi.
Therefore , the effect of the misbehaving set K on the final consensus state is 1piBKc. Clearly, if the vector
x(0) + BKc is a valid initial state, the misbehaving agents cannot be detected. On the other hand, since
it is possible for uncompromised nodes to estimate the observable part of the initial state of the whole
network, if an acceptability region (or an a priori probability distribution) is available on initial states,
then, by analyzing the reconstructed state, a form of intrusion detection can be applied, e.g., see [22]. We
conclude this paragraph by showing that, if the misbehaving vector BKc belongs to the unobservability
subspace of (A,Cj), for some j, then the misbehaving agents do not alter the final consensus value. Let v
be an eigenvector associated with the unobservable eigenvalue z¯, i.e., (z¯I−A)v = 0 and Cjv = 0. We have
pi(z¯I−A)v = (z¯−1)piv = 0, and, because of the detectability of (A,Cj), |z¯| < 1 (cf. Lemma V.1). Hence
piv = 0. Therefore, if the attack BKc is unobservable from any agent, then limt→∞AtBKc = 1piBKc = 0,
so that the change of the initial states of misbehaving agents does not affect the final consensus value.
A different class of unidentifiable attacks consists of injecting a signal corresponding to an input-zero
for the current network state. We start by characterizing the potential disruption caused by misbehaving
4The agent i is an out-neighbor of j if the (i, j)-th entry of A is nonzero, or, equivalently, if (j, i) belongs to the edge set.
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Fig. 1. In Fig. 1(a) The agents {1, 2} are misbehaving. The consensus system (A,B{1,2}, C3) has unstable zeros. In Fig. 1(b) the agents
{1, 2} are misbehaving. The consensus system (A,B{1,2}, C6) is not left-invertible.
nodes that introduce nonzero, but exponentially vanishing inputs.5
Lemma V.3 (Exponentially stable input) Let A be a consensus matrix, and let K be a set of agents.
Let u : N 7→ R|K| be exponentially decaying. There exists z ∈ (0, 1) and u¯ ∈ R|K| such that
lim
t→∞
t∑
τ=0
At−τBKu(τ)  (1− z)−11piBK u¯,
where  denotes component-wise inequality, 1 is the vector of all ones of appropriate dimension, and pi
is such that piA = pi.
Proof: Let z ∈ (0, 1) and 0  u0 ∈ R|K| be such that u(k)  zku0. Then, since A is a non-
negative matrix, for all t, τ ∈ N, with t ≥ τ , we have At−τBKu(τ)  At−τBKzτu0, and hence
limt→∞
∑t
τ=0A
t−τBKu(τ)  limt→∞
∑t
τ=0A
t−τBKzτu0. Notice that (1− z)−1 = limt→∞
∑t
τ=0 z
τ . We
now show that limt→∞
∑t
τ=0 z
τ (1pi−At−τ ) = limt→∞
∑t
τ=0 E(t, τ)  0, from which the theorem follows.
Let e(t, τ) be any component of E(t, τ). Because limt→∞At = 1pi, there exist c and ρ, with |z| ≤ |ρ| < 1,
such that e(t, τ) ≤ czτρt−τ . We have
lim
t→∞
t∑
τ=0
czτρt−τ = lim
t→∞
cρt
t∑
τ=0
zτρ−τ = 0,
so that
∑t
τ=0E(t, τ) converges to zero as t approaches infinity.
Following Lemma V.3, if the zero dynamics are exponentially stable, then misbehaving agents can
affect the final consensus value by a constant amount without being detected, if and only if they inject
vanishing inputs along input-zero directions. If an admissible region is known for the network state, then
a tight bound on the effect of misbehaving agents injecting vanishing inputs can be provided. Notice
moreover that, in this situation, a well-behaving agent is able to detect misbehaving agents whose state
is outside an admissible region by simply analyzing its state. Finally, for certain consensus networks, the
effect of an exponentially stable input decreases to zero with the cardinality of the network. Indeed, let
pi = p¯i/n, where p¯i is a constant row vector and n denotes the cardinality of the network. For instance,
if A is doubly stochastic, then pi = 1T/n [19]. Then, when n grows, the effect of the input u(t) = ztu¯,
with |z| < 1, on the consensus value becomes negligible.
The left-invertibility and the stability of the zero dynamics are not an inherent property of a consensus
system. Consider for instance the graph of Fig. 1(a), where the agents {1, 2} are malicious. If the network
matrices are
5An output-zeroing input can always be written as u(k) = −(CAνB)†CAν+1(KνA)kx(0) −
(CAνB)†CAν+1
(∑k−1
l=0 (KνA)
k−1−lBuh(l)
)
+ uh(h), where ν ∈ N, (CAνB) is the first nonzero Markov parameter,
Kν = I − B(CAνB)†CAν is a projection matrix, x(0) ∈ ⋂νl=0Ker(CAl) is the system initial state, and uh(k) is such that
CAνBuh(k) = 0 [21].
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A =

1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0
0 1/2 0 0 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0
1/16 0 5/8 1/16 0 1/4 0 0
0 1/16 1/4 0 5/16 0 3/8 0
1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 0
0 1/3 0 0 2/3 0 0 0
1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0
 , B{1,2} =

1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
 , C3 = [ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
]
,
then the system (A,B{1,2}, C3) is left-invertible, but the invariant zeros are {0,+2,−2}. Hence, for some
initial conditions, there exist non vanishing input sequences that do not appear in the output. Moreover,
for the graph in Fig. 1(b), let the network matrices be
A =

1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1/4 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 0
0 0 1/4 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 1/4
0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0
0 0 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
1/4 0 0 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 1/4
 , B{1,2} =

1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
 , C6 = [ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ] .
It can be verified that the system (A,B{1,2}, C6) is not left-invertible. Indeed, for zero initial conditions,
any input of the form u1 = −u2 does not appear in the output sequence of the agent 6. In some cases,
the left-invertibility of a consensus system can be asserted independently of the consensus matrix.
Theorem V.1 (Left-invertibility, single intruder case) Let A be a consensus matrix, and let Bi = ei,
Cj = e
T
j . Then the system (A,Bi, Cj) is left-invertible.
Proof: Suppose, by contradiction, that (A,Bi, Cj) is not left-invertible. Then there exist state trajec-
tories that, starting from the origin, are invisible to the output. In other words, since the input is a scalar,
the Markov parameters CjAtBi have to be zero for all t. Notice the (i, k)-th component of At is nonzero
if there exists a path of length t from i to k. Because A is irreducible, there exists t such that CjAtBi 6= 0,
and therefore the consensus system is left-invertible.
If in Theorem V.1 one identifies the i-th node with a single intruder, and the j-th node with an
observer node, the theorem states that, for known initial conditions of the network, any two distinct inputs
generated by a single intruder produce different outputs at all observing nodes, and hence can be detected.
Consider for example a flocking application, in which the agent are supposed to agree on the velocity
to be maintained during the execution of the task [1]. Suppose that a linear consensus iteration is used
to compute a common velocity vector, and suppose that the states of the agents are equal to each other.
Then no single misbehaving agent can change the velocity of the team without being detected, because
no zero dynamic can be generated by a single agent starting from a consensus state.
We now consider the case in which several misbehaving agents are allowed to act simultaneously. The
following result relating the position of the misbehaving agents in the network and the zero dynamics of
a consensus system can be asserted.
Theorem V.2 (Stability of zero dynamics) Let K be a set of agents and let j be a network node. The
zero dynamics of the consensus system (A,BK , Cj) are exponentially stable if one of the following is
true:
(i) the system (A,BK , Cj) is left-invertible, and there are no edges from the nodes K to V \{Nj ∪K};
(ii) the system (A,BK , Cj) is left-invertible, and there are no edges from the nodes V \ {Nj ∪K} to
Nj; or
(iii) the sets K and Nj are such that K ⊆ Nj .
Proof: Let z be an invariant zero, x and u a state-zero and input-zero direction, so that
(zI − A)x+BKu = 0, and Cjx = 0 (6)
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Fig. 2. The stability of the zero dynamics of a left-invertible consensus system can be asserted depending upon the location of the misbehaving
agents in the network. Let j be the observer agent, and let K be the misbehaving set. Then, the zero dynamics are asymptotically stable if
the set Nj separates the sets K and V \ {Nj ∪K} (cfr. Fig. 2(a)), or if the set K separates the sets Nj and V \ {Nj ∪K} (cfr. Fig. 2(b)),
or if the set K is a subset of Nj (cfr. Fig. 2(c)).
Reorder the nodes such that the set K comes first, the set Nj \K second, and the set V \{K ∪Nj} third.
The consensus matrix and the vector x are accordingly partitioned as
A =
A11 A12 A13A21 A22 A23
A31 A32 A33
 , x =
x1x2
x3
 ,
and the input and output matrices become BK = [I 0 0]T and Cj = [∗ I 0]. For equations (6) to be
verified, it has to be x2 = 0, zx1 = A11x1 + A13x3 − uk, and[
0
zx3
]
=
[
A21 A23
A31 A33
] [
x1
x3
]
.
Case (i). Since there are no edges from the nodes K to V \ {Nj ∪K}, we have A31 = 0, and hence it
has to be (zI −A33)x3 = 0, i.e., z needs to be an eigenvalue of A33. We now show that x3 6= 0. Suppose
by contradiction that x3 = 0, and that z is an invariant zero, with state-zero and input-zero direction
x = [xT1 0 0]
T and uK = (zI − A11)x1, respectively. Then, for all complex value z¯, the vectors x and
uK = (z¯I−A11)x1 constitute the state-zero and the input-zero direction associated with the invariant zero
z¯. Because the system is assumed to be left-invertible, there can only be a finite number of invariant zeros
[21], so that we conclude that x3 6= 0 or that the system has no zero dynamics. Because z needs to be an
eigenvalue of A33, and because of Lemma III.1, we conclude that the zero dynamics are asymptotically
stable.
Case (ii). Since there are no edges from the nodes V \ {Nj ∪ K} to Nj , we have A23 = 0. We
now show that Ker(A21) = 0. Suppose by contradiction that 0 6= x1 ∈ Ker(A21). Consider the equation
(zI−A33)x3 = A31x1, and notice that, because of Lemma III.1, for all z with |z| ≥ 1, the matrix zI−A33
is invertible. Therefore, if |z| ≥ 1, the vector [(x1)T 0 ((zI − A33)−1A31x1)T]T is a state-zero direction,
with input-zero direction uK = −(zI − A11)x1 + A13x3. The system would have an infinite number of
invariant zeros, being therefore not left-invertible. We conclude that Ker(A21) = 0. Consequently, we have
x1 = 0 and (zI − A33)x3 = 0, so that |z| < 1.
Case (iii). Reorder the variables such that the nodes Nj come before V \ Nj . For the existence of a
zero dynamics, it needs to hold x1 = 0 and (zI − A22)x2 = 0. Hence, |z| < 1.
We are left to study the case of a network with zeros outside the open unit disk, where intruders
may inject non-vanishing inputs while remaining unidentified. For this situation, we only remark that a
detection procedure based on an admissible region for the network state can be implemented to detect
inputs evolving along unstable zero directions.
VI. GENERIC DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF MISBEHAVING AGENTS
In the framework of traditional control theory, the entries of the matrices describing a dynamical
system are assumed to be known without uncertainties. It is often the case, however, that such entries
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only approximate the exact values. In order to capture this modeling uncertainty, structured systems have
been introduced and studied, e.g., see [23], [16], [24]. Let a structure matrix [M ] be a matrix in which
each entry is either a fixed zero or an indeterminate parameter, and let the tuple of structure matrices
([A], [B], [C], [D]) denote the structured system
x(t+ 1) = [A]x(t) + [B]u(t),
y(t) = [C]x(t) + [D]u(t).
(7)
A numerical system (A,B,C,D) is an admissible realization of ([A], [B], [C], [D]) if it can be obtained
by fixing the indeterminate entries of the structure matrices at some particular value, and two systems
are structurally equivalent if they are both an admissible realization of the same structured system. Let
d be the number of indeterminate entries altogether. By collecting the indeterminate parameters into a
vector, an admissible realization is mapped to a point in the Euclidean space Rd. A property which can
be asserted on a dynamical system is called structural (or generic) if, informally, it holds for almost
all admissible realizations. To be more precise, following [24], we say that a property is structural (or
generic) if and only if the set of admissible realizations satisfying such property forms a dense subset
of the parameters space.6 Moreover, it can be shown that, if a property holds generically, then the set of
parameters for which such property is not verified lies on an algebraic hypersurface of Rd, i.e., it has zero
Lebesgue measure in the parameter space. For instance, left-invertibility of a dynamical system is known
to be a structural property with respect to the parameters space Rd.
Let the connectivity of a structured system ([A], [B], [C]) be the connectivity of the graph defined by its
nonzero parameters. In what follows, we assume [D] = 0, and we study the zero dynamics of a structured
consensus system as a function of its connectivity. Let the generic rank of a structure matrix [M ] be the
maximal rank over all possible numerical realizations of [M ].
Lemma VI.1 (Generic zero dynamics and connectivity) Let ([A], [B], [C]) be a k-connected structured
system. If the generic rank of [B] is less than k, then almost every numerical realization of ([A], [B], [C])
has no zero dynamics.
Proof: Since the system ([A], [B], [C]) is k-connected and the generic rank r of [B] is less than
k, there are r disjoint paths from the input to the output [25]. Then, from Theorem 4.3 in [25], the
system ([A], [B], [C]) is generically left-invertible. Additionally, by using Lemma 3 in [13], it can be
shown that ([A], [B], [C]) has generically no invariant zeros. We conclude that almost every realization of
([A], [B], [C]) has no nontrivial zero dynamics.
Given a structured triple ([A], [B], [C]) with d nonzero elements, the set of parameters that make
([A], [B], [C]) a consensus system is a subset S of Rd, because the matrix A needs to be row stochastic
and primitive. A certain property that holds generically in Rd needs not be valid generically with respect
to the feasible set S. Let ([A], [B], [C]) be structure matrices, and let S ⊂ Rd be the set of parameters
that make ([A], [B], [C]) a consensus system. We next show that the left-invertibility and the number of
invariant zeros are generic properties with respect to the parameter space S.
Theorem VI.1 (Genericity of consensus systems) Let ([A], [B], [C]) be a k-connected structured sys-
tem. If the generic rank of [B] is less than k, then almost every consensus realization of ([A], [B], [C])
has no zero dynamics.
Proof: Let d be the number of nonzero entries of the structured system ([A], [B], [C]). From Theorem
VI.1 we know that, generically with respect to the parameter space Rd, a numerical realization of
([A], [B], [C]) has no zero dynamics. Let S ⊂ Rd be the subset of parameters that makes ([A], [B], [C]) a
consensus system. We want to show that the absence of zero dynamics is a generic property with respect
to the parameter space S. Observe that S is dense in Rd¯, where d¯ ≤ d − n and n is the dimension of
6A subset S ⊆ P ⊆ Rd is dense in P if, for each r ∈ P and every ε > 0, there exists s ∈ S such that the Euclidean distance ‖s−r‖ ≤ ε.
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[A]. Then [26], [27], it can be shown that, in order to prove that our property is generic with respect
to S, it is sufficient to show that there exist some consensus systems which have no zero dynamics. To
construct a consensus system with no zero dynamics consider the following procedure. Let (A,B,C) be
a nonnegative and irreducible linear system with no zero dynamics, where the number of inputs is strictly
less that the connectivity of the associated graph. Notice that, following the above discussion, such system
can always be found. The Perron-Frobenius Theorem for nonnegative matrices ensures the existence of
a positive eigenvector x of A associated with the eigenvalue of largest magnitude r [19]. Let D be the
diagonal matrix whose main diagonal equals x, then the matrix r−1D−1AD is a consensus matrix [28].
A change of coordinates of (A,B,C) using D yields the system (D−1AD,D−1B,CD), which has no
zero dynamics. Finally, the system (r−1D−1AD,D−1B,CD) is a k-connected consensus system with,
generically, no zero dynamics. Indeed, if there exists a value z¯, a state-zero direction x0, and an input-zero
direction g for the system (r−1D−1AD,D−1B,CD), then the value z¯r, with state direction x0/r and input
direction g, is an invariant zero of (D−1AD,D−1B,CD), which contradicts the hypothesis.
Because a sufficiently connected consensus system has generically no zero dynamics, the following
remarks about the robustness of a generic property should be considered. First, generic means open,
i.e. some appropriately small perturbations of the matrices of the system having a generic property do not
destroy this property. Second, generic implies dense, hence any consensus system which does not have a
generic property can be changed into a system having this property just by arbitrarily small perturbations.
We are now able to state our generic resilience results for consensus networks.
Theorem VI.2 (Generic identification of misbehaving agents) Given a k-connected consensus network,
generically, there exist only identifiable inputs for any set of bk−1
2
c misbehaving agents. Moreover,
generically, there exist identifiable inputs for every set of k − 1 misbehaving agents.
Proof: Since 2bk−1
2
c < k, by Lemma VI.1 the consensus system with any set of 2bk−1
2
c has generically
no zero dynamics. By Theorem IV.3, any set of bk−1
2
c malicious agents is detectable and identifiable by
every node in the network. We now consider the case of faulty agents. Let V be the set of nodes, and
K1, K2 ⊂ V , with |K1| = |K2| = k − 1, be two disjoint sets of faulty agents. Let j ∈ V . We need to
show the existence of identifiable, i.e., faulty, inputs. By using a result of [25] on the generic rank of the
matrix pencil of a structured system, since the given consensus network is k-connected and |K1| = k− 1,
it can be shown that the system (A, [BK1 Bi], Cj), for all i ∈ K2, is left-invertible, which confirms the
existence of identifiable inputs for the current network state. By Definition 4, we conclude that the faulty
set K1 is generically identifiable by any well-behaving agent.
In other words, in a k-connected network, up to bk−1
2
c (resp. k− 1) malicious (resp. faulty) agents are
generically identifiable by every well behaving agent. Analogously, it can be shown that generically up
to k − 1 misbehaving agents are generically detectable. In the next section, we describe three algorithms
to detect and identify misbehaving agents.
VII. INTRUSION DETECTION ALGORITHMS
In this section we present three decentralized algorithms to detect and identify misbehaving agents in
a consensus network. Although the first two algorithms require only local measurements, the complete
knowledge of the consensus network is necessary for the implementation. The third algorithm, instead,
requires the agents to know only a certain neighborhood of the consensus graph, and it allows for a local
identification of misbehaving agents. As it will be clear in the sequel, the third algorithm overcomes,
under a reasonable set of assumptions, the limitations inherent to centralized detection and identification
procedures.
Our first algorithm is based upon the following result.
Theorem VII.1 (Detection filter) Let K be the set of misbehaving agents. Assume that the zero dynamics
of the consensus system (A,BK , Cj) are exponentially stable, for some j. Let ANj denote the Nj columns
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of the matrix A. The filter
z(t+ 1) = (A+GCj)z(t)−GCjx(t),
x˜(t) = Lz(t) +HCjx(t),
(8)
with G = −ANj , H = CTj , and L = I − HCj , is such that, in the limit for t → ∞, the vector
x˜(t + 1)− Ax˜(t) is nonzero only if the input uK(t) is nonzero. Moreover, if K ⊂ Nj , then the filter (8)
asymptotically estimates the state of the network, independent of the behavior of the misbehaving agents
K.
Proof: Let G = −ANj , and consider the estimation error e(t + 1) = z(t + 1) − x(t + 1) = (A +
GCj)e(t) − BKuK(t). Notice that Le(t) = Lz(t) + CTj Cjx(t) − x(t), and hence x˜(t) = x(t) + Le(t).
Consequently, x˜(t + 1) − Ax˜(t) = BKuK(t) + Le(t + 1) − ALe(t). By using Lemma III.1, it is a
straightforward matter to show that (A + GCj) is Schur stable. If uK(t) = 0, then x˜(t + 1) − Ax˜(t)
converges to zero. Suppose now that K ⊆ Nj . The reachable set of e, i.e., the minimum (A+GCj) invariant
containing BK , coincides with BK . Indeed (A + GCj)BK = ∅. Since BK ⊆ Ker(L) by construction, the
vectors Le(t) and x˜(t)− x(t) converge to zero.
By means of the filter described in the above theorem, a distributed intrusion detection procedure
can be designed, see [11]. Here, each well-behaving agent only implements one detection filter, making
the asymptotic detection task computationally easy to be accomplished. We remark that, since the filter
converges exponentially, an exponentially decaying input of appropriate size may remain undetected (see
Lemma V.3 for a characterization of the effect of exponentially vanishing inputs on the final consensus
value). For a finite time detection of misbehaving agents, and for the identification of misbehaving
components, a more sophisticated algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
Theorem VII.2 (Complete identification) Let A be a consensus matrix, let K be the set of misbehaving
agents, and let c be the connectivity of the consensus network. Assume that:
(i) every agent knows the matrix A and k ≥ |K|, and
(ii) k < c, if the set K is faulty, and 2k < c if the set K is malicious.
Then the Complete Identification algorithm allows each well-behaving agent to generically detect and
identify every misbehaving agent in finite time.
Proof: We focus on agent j. Let k = |K|, and let K be the set containing all the (n−1
k+1
)
combinations
of k+ 1 elements of V \ {j}. For each set K˜ ∈ K, consider the system ΣK˜ = (A,BK˜ , Cj), and compute7
a set of residual generator filters for ΣK˜ . If the connectivity of the communication graph is sufficiently
high, then, generically, each residual function is nonzero if and only if the corresponding input is nonzero.
Let K be the set of misbehaving nodes, then, whenever K ⊂ K˜, the residual function associated with the
input K˜ \K becomes zero after an initial transient, so that the agent K˜ \K is recognized as well-behaving.
By exclusion, because the residuals associated with the misbehaving agents are always nonzero, the set
K is identified.
By means of the Complete Identification algorithm, the detection and the identification of the misbehav-
ing agents take place in finite time, because the residual generators can be designed as dead-beat filters, and
independent of the misbehaving input. It should be noticed that, although no communication overhead is
introduced in the consensus protocol, the Complete Identification procedure relies on strong assumptions.
First, each agent needs to know the entire graph topology, and second, the number of residual generators
that each node needs to design is proportional to
(
n−1
k
)
. Because an agent needs to update these filters
after each communication round, when the cardinality of the network grows, the computational burden
may overcome the capabilities of the agents, making this procedure inapplicable.
7We refer the interested reader to [17] for a design procedure of a dead beat residual generator. Notice that the possibility of detecting
and identifying the misbehaving agents is, as discussed in Section IV and VI, guaranteed by the absence of zero dynamics in the consensus
system.
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Algorithm 1 Complete Identification (j-th agent)
Input : A; k ≥ |K|;
Require : The connectivity of A to be k + 1, if K is faulty, and 2k + 1 otherwise;
Compute the residual generators for every set of k + 1 misbehaving agents;
while the misbehaving agents are unidentified do
Exchange data with the neighbors;
Update the state;
Evaluate the residual functions;
if every ith residual is nonzero then
Agent i is recognized as misbehaving.
In the remaining part of this section, we present a computationally efficient procedure that only assumes
partial knowledge of the consensus network but yet allows for a local identification of the misbehaving
agents. Let A be a consensus matrix, and observe that it can be written as Ad + ε∆, where ‖∆‖∞ = 2,
0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, and Ad is block diagonal with a consensus matrix on each of the N diagonal blocks. For
instance, let A = [akj], and let V1, . . . , VN be the subsets of agents associated with the blocks. Then the
matrix Ad = [a¯kj] can be defined as
(i) a¯kj = akj if k 6= j, and k, j ∈ Vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(ii) a¯kk = 1−
∑
j∈Vi,j 6=k akj , and
(iii) a¯kj = 0 otherwise.
Moreover, ∆ = 2(A−Ad)/‖(A−Ad)‖∞, and ε = 12‖A−Ad‖∞. Note that, if ε is “small”, then the agents
belonging to different groups are weakly coupled. We assume the groups of weakly coupled agents to be
given, and we leave the problem of finding such partitions as the subject of future research, for which
the ideas presented in [29], [30] constitute a very relevant result.
We now focus on the h-th block. Let K = v ∪ l be the set of misbehaving agents, where v = Vh ∩K,
and l = K \ v. Assume that the set v is identifiable by agent j ∈ Vh (see Section IV). Then, agent j can
identify the set v by means of a set of residual generators, each one designed to decouple a different set
of |v|+ 1 inputs. To be more precise, let i ∈ Vh \ v, and consider the system[
x
wv
]+
=
[
Ad 0
EvCj Fv
] [
x
wv
]
+
[
Bv Bi
0 0
] [
uv
ui
]
,
rv =
[
HvCj Mv
] [ x
wv
]
,
(9)
and the system [
x
wi
]+
=
[
Ad 0
EiCj Fi
] [
x
wi
]
+
[
Bv Bi
0 0
] [
uv
ui
]
,
ri =
[
HiCj Mi
] [ x
wi
]
,
(10)
where the quadruple (Fv, Ev,Mv, Hv) (resp. (Fi, Ei,Mi, Hi)) describes a filter of the form (2), and it is
designed as in [17]. Then the misbehaving agents v are identifiable by agent j because v is the only set
such that, for every i ∈ Vh \ v, it holds rv 6≡ 0 and ri ≡ 0 whenever uv 6≡ 0. It should be noticed that,
since Ad is block diagonal, the residual generators to identify the set v can be designed by only knowing
the h-th block of Ad, and hence only a finite region of the original consensus network. By applying the
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Algorithm 2 Local Identification (j-th agent)
Input : Ah; kj ≥ |K ∩ Vh|; threshold Th
Require : The connectivity of Ajd to be kj + 1, if K is faulty, and 2kj + 1 otherwise;
while the misbehaving agents are unidentified do
Exchange data with the neighbors;
Update the state;
Evaluate the residual functions;
if ith residual is greater than Th then
Agent i is recognized as misbehaving.
residual generators to the consensus system Ad + ε∆ with misbehaving agents K we get[
xˆ
wˆv
]+
= A¯ε,v
[
xˆ
wˆv
]
+
[
Bv Bl Bi
0 0 0
]uvul
ui
 ,
rˆv =
[
HvCj Mv
] [ xˆ
wˆv
]
,
and [
xˆ
wˆi
]+
= A¯ε,i
[
xˆ
wˆi
]
+
[
Bv Bl Bi
0 0 0
]uvul
ui
 ,
rˆi =
[
HiCj Mi
] [ xˆ
wˆi
]
,
where
A¯ε,v =
[
Ad + ε∆ 0
EvCj Fv
]
, A¯ε,i =
[
Ad + ε∆ 0
EiCj Fi
]
.
Because of the matrix ∆ and the input ul(t), the residual ri(t) is generally nonzero even if ui ≡ 0. However,
the misbehaving agents v remain identifiable by j if for each i ∈ Vh \ v we have ‖rˆv‖∞ > ‖rˆi‖∞ for all
uv 6≡ 0.
Theorem VII.3 (Local identification) Let V be the set of agents, let K be the set of misbehaving agents,
and let Ad + ε∆ be a consensus matrix, where Ad is block diagonal, ‖∆‖∞ = 2, and 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Let
each block h of Ad be a consensus matrix with agents Vh ⊆ V , and with connectivity |K ∩Vh|+ 1. There
exists α > 0 and umax ≥ 0, such that, if each input signal ui(t), i ∈ K, takes value in U = {u : εαumax ≤
‖u‖∞ ≤ umax},8 then each well-behaving agent j ∈ Vh identifies in finite time the faulty agents K ∩ Vh
by means of the Local Identification algorithm.
Proof: We focus on the agent j ∈ Vh, and, without loss of generality, we assume that uK(0) 6= 0, and
that the residual generators have a finite impulse response. Let dj = ‖Vh‖, and note that dj time steps are
sufficient for each agent j ∈ Vh to identify the misbehaving agents. Let ut denote the input sequence up to
time t. Let v = K ∩Vh, l = K \ v, and observe that rˆv(dj) = [HvCj Mv ] A¯djε,vx¯(0) + hˆv ?udj−1v + hˆl ?udj−1l ,
where hˆv and hˆl denote the impulse response from uv and ul respectively, and ? denotes the convolution
operator. We now determine an upper bound for each term of rˆv(dj). Let the misbehaving inputs take
8The norm ‖u‖∞ is intended in the vector sense at every instant of time. The misbehaving input is here assumed to be nonzero at every
instant of time.
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value in U = {u : εαumax ≤ ‖u‖∞ ≤ umax}. By using the triangle inequality on the impulse responses
of the residual generator, it can be shown that ‖hˆl ? udj−1l ‖∞ ≤ ‖hl ? udj−1l ‖∞ + εc1umax = εc1umax,
where hl denotes the impulse response form ul to rv of the system (9), and c1 is a finite positive constant
independent of ε. Moreover, it can be shown that there exist two positive constant c2 and c3 such that
‖ [HvCj Mv ] A¯djε,vx¯(0)‖∞ ≤ εc2umax, and minuv∈U ‖hˆv ? udj−1v ‖∞ ≥ minuv∈U ‖hv ? udj−1v ‖∞ − εc3umax.
Analogously, for the residual generator associated with the well-behaving agent i, we have rˆi(dj) =
[HiCj Mi ] A¯
dj
ε,ix¯(0) + hˆv ? u
dj−1
v + hˆl ? u
dj−1
l , and hence rˆi(dj) ≤ ε(c(i)4 + c(i)5 + c(i)6 )umax. Let c¯ = c1 +
c2 + c3 + maxi∈Vh\v(c
(i)
4 + c
(i)
5 + c
(i)
6 ), and let β be such that minuv∈U ‖hv ? udj−1v ‖∞ > βumin. Then a
correct identification of the misbehaving agents v takes place if βumin = βεαumax > εc¯umax, and hence if
α > c¯/β.
Notice that the constant α in Theorem VII.3 can be computed by bounding the infinity norm of the
impulse response of the residual generators. An example is in Section VIII-B. A procedure to achieve
local detection and identification of misbehaving agents is in Algorithm 2, where Ahd denotes the h-th
block of Ad, and Th the corresponding threshold value. Observe that in the Local Identification procedure
an agent only performs local computation, and it is assumed to have only local knowledge of the network
structure.
Remark 3 It is a nontrivial fact that the misbehaving agents become locally identifiable depending on
the magnitude of ε. Indeed, as long as ε > 0, the effect of the perturbation ε∆ on the residuals becomes
eventually relevant and prevents, after a certain time, a correct identification of the misbehaviors [29].
VIII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Complete detection and identification
Consider the network of Fig. 3(a), and let A be a randomly chosen consensus matrix. In particular, let
A =

0.2795 0.1628 0 0.1512 0.4066 0 0 0
0.0143 0.3363 0.3469 0 0 0.3025 0 0
0 0.0718 0.1904 0.2438 0 0 0.4941 0
0.0844 0 0.4457 0.0660 0 0 0 0.4040
0.1709 0 0 0 0.2694 0.2472 0 0.3125
0 0.4199 0 0 0.1575 0.3293 0.0932 0
0 0 0.0174 0 0 0.4241 0.2850 0.2735
0 0 0 0.3024 0.2039 0 0.2065 0.2873
 .
The network is 3-connected, and it can be verified that for any set K of 3 misbehaving agents, and for any
observer node j, the triple (A,BK , Cj) is left-invertible. Also, for any set K of cardinality 2, and for any
node j, the triple (A,BK , Cj) has no invariant zeros. As previously discussed, any well-behaving node can
detect and identify up to 2 faulty agents, or up to 1 malicious agent. Consider the observations of the agent
1, and suppose that the agents {3, 7} inject a random signal into the network. As described in Algorithm
1, the agent 1 designs the residual generator filters and computes the residual functions for each of the(
7
3
)
possible sets of misbehaving nodes, and identify the well-behaving agents. Consider for example the
system x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + B3u3(t) + B4u4(t) + B7u7(t), and suppose we want to design a filter of the
form (2) which is only sensible to the signal u4. The unobservability subspace SM{3,7} = (V∗{3,7} + S∗{3,7}),
is
SM{3,7} = Im


0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −0.6624 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 −0.4740 −0.6597 0
0 0 −0.8798 0.3548 0
0.4116 0 −0.0327 0.0132 0
0 0 0 0 1
0.9114 0 0.0148 −0.0060 0

 ,
and a possible choice for the matrices of the residual generator is
F =
[
0 0 0
0.0014 −0.3222 −0.3424
−0.0013 0.3031 0.3222
]
, E =
[
0.2795 0.1628 0.1512 0.4066
0.0138 0.4982 −0.2280 0.2003
0.0082 −0.6095 0.3012 −0.1568
]
,
M = [ −1 0 00 0.9999 0.0128 ] , and H = [
1 0 0 0
0 −0.7491 0.5832 −0.3142 ] .
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Fig. 3. In Fig. 3(a) a consensus network where the nodes 3 and 7 are faulty. In Fig. 3(b) the residual functions computed by the agent 1
under the hypothesis that the misbehaving set is {3, 4, 7}.
It can be checked that, independent of the initial condition of the network, the residual function associated
with the input 4 is zero, as in 3(b), so that the agent 4 is regarded as well-behaving. Agents 3, 7, instead,
have always nonzero residual functions, and are recognized as misbehaving. If the misbehaving nodes
are allowed to be malicious, then no more than 1 misbehaving node can be tolerated. Indeed, because of
Theorem IV.1, there exists a set K¯ of 4 misbehaving agents such that the system (A,BK¯ , C1) exhibits
nontrivial zero dynamics. For instance, let K¯ = {2, 4, 6, 8}, and note that if the initial condition x(0)
belongs to
V∗ = Im


0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0.7842 0
0 0 1
0 −0.6205 0

 ,
then the input uK(t) = Fbx(t),9 where
Fb =
[
0 0 −0.3469 0 0 −0.1860 0 0.1472
0 0 −0.4457 0 0 0.1966 0 −0.1555
0 0 0 0 0 −0.1063 −0.1148 0.0841
0 0 0 0 0 0.0636 −0.1894 −0.0503
]
,
is such that y1(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, the two systems (A,B{2,4}, C1) and (A,B{6,8}, C1), with
initial conditions x1(0) and x2(0) = x1(0)− x(0), and inputs
u{2,4}(t) = [ 1 0 0 00 1 0 0 ]Fb(x1(t)− x2(t)), u{6,8}(t) = [ 0 0 1 00 0 0 1 ]Fb(x2(t)− x1(t)),
have exactly the same output dynamics, so that the two sets {2, 4} and {6, 8} are indistinguishable by
the agent 1.
B. Local detection and identification
Consider the consensus network in Fig. 4(a), where A = Ad + ε∆, ε ∈ R, 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, and
Ad =

1
3
1
3
1
3
0 0 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 0 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 0 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 0 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 0 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
 ,∆ =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 −1
 .
9The malicious agents need to know the entire state to implement this feedback law. The case in which only local feedback is allowed is
left as a direction for future research, for which the result in [12] is meaningful.
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Fig. 4. In Fig. 4(a) a consensus network with weak connections. In Fig. 4(b) the solid line corresponds to the largest magnitude of the
residual associated with the well-behaving agent 3, while the dashed line denotes the smallest magnitude of the residual associated with the
misbehaving agent 2, both as a function of the parameter ε. If ε ≤ ε∗, then there exists a threshold that allows to identify the misbehaving
agent 2.
Let K = {2, 7} be the set of misbehaving agents, let 0.1 ≤ u2(t), u7(t) ≤ 3 at each time t, and
let ‖x(0)‖∞ ≤ 1. Consider the agent 1, and let (F2, E2,M2, H2) and (F3, E3,M3, H3) be the residual
generators as in (9) and (10), respectively, where
F2 =
[
−1/3 −1/3
1/3 1/3
]
, E2 =
[
−2/3 0 −1/3
2/3 0 1/3
]
,M2 = [
1 0
0 −1 ] , H2 = [ 1 0 00 1 0 ] ,
and
F3 =
[
−1/3 1/3
−1/3 1/3
]
, E3 =
[
−2/3 −1/3 0
−2/3 −1/3 0
]
,M3 = [
−1 0
0 1 ] , H3 = [
−1 0 0
0 0 1 ] .
Let hˆ32 (resp. hˆ
3
7) be the impulse response from the input u2 (resp. u7) to rˆ3, and let u
1
2 (resp. u
1
7) denote
the input signal u2 (resp. u7) up to time 1. Note that the misbehaving agent can be identified after 2 time
steps, and that the residual associated with the agent 3 is
rˆ3(2) = [H3C1 M3 ]
[
Ad+ε∆ 0
E3C1 F3
]2 [ x(0)
0
]
+ hˆ32 ? u
1
2 + hˆ
3
7 ? u
1
7,
where ? denotes the convolution operator. After some computation we obtain
rˆ3(2) = ε [H3C1 M3 ]
[
Ad∆+∆Ad+ε∆
2 ∆B2 ∆B7
E3C1∆ 0 0
] [ x(0)
u2(0)
u7(0)
]
and, analogously,
rˆ2(2) = ε [H2C1 M2 ]
[
Ad∆+∆Ad+ε∆
2 ∆B2 ∆B7
E2C1∆ 0 0
] [ x(0)
u2(0)
u7(0)
]
+ [H2C1 M2 ]
[
AdB2 B2
E2C1B2 0
] [ u2(0)
u2(1)
]
Recall that the agent 1 is able to identify the misbehaving agent 2 if, independent of u12 and u
1
7, there exists
a threshold T such that ‖rˆ2(2)‖∞ ≥ T , and ‖rˆ3(2)‖∞ < T . The behavior of ‖rˆ2(2)‖∞ and ‖rˆ3(2)‖∞ as
a function of ε is in Fig. 4(b). Note that for ε = ε∗ = 0.026 we have ‖rˆ2(2)‖∞ = ‖rˆ3(2)‖∞ = 0.07. For
instance, if ε = 0.01, then it can be verified that ‖rˆ2(2)‖∞ > 0.1, and ‖rˆ3(2)‖∞ < 0.05. It follows that a
threshold T = 0.1 allows the agent 1 to identify the misbehaving agent 2. On the other hand, if ε = 0.03,
then ‖rˆ2(2)‖∞ ≥ 0.01, and ‖rˆ3(2)‖∞ ≤ 0.12, so that the misbehaving agent 2 may remain unidentified.
Indeed, if x(0) = [ 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 ], u12 = u
1
7 = [ 0.1 0.1 ], then ‖rˆ2(2)‖∞ = 0.01 and ‖rˆ3(2)‖∞ = 0.12, so
that the agent 3 is recognized as misbehaving instead of the agent 2.
As a final remark, note that the larger the consensus network, the more convenient the proposed
approximation procedure becomes. For instance, consider the network presented in [31], and here reported
in Fig. 5(a). Such a clustered interconnection structure, in which the edges connecting different clusters
have a small weight, may be preferable in many applications because much simpler and efficient protocols
can be implemented within each cluster. Assume the presence of a misbehaving agent in each cluster, and
consider the residuals computed after 5 steps of the consensus algorithm. Let ε be the weight of the edges
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Fig. 5. In Fig. 5(a) a consensus network partitioned into 3 areas. Each agent identifies the neighboring misbehaving agents by knowing
only the topology of the subnetwork it belongs to. In Fig. 5(b) the smallest magnitude of the residual associated with a misbehaving agent
(dashed line) and the largest magnitude of the residual associated with a well-behaving agent (solid line) are plotted as a function of ε. If ε
is sufficiently small, then local detection and identification is possible.
connecting different clusters. Fig. 5(b) shows, as a function of ε, the smallest magnitude of the residual
associated with a misbehaving agent (dashed line) versus the largest magnitude of the residual associated
with a well-behaving agent (solid line). If ε is sufficiently small, then our local identification method
allows each well-behaving agent to promptly detect and identify the misbehaving agents belonging to
the same group, and hence to restore the functionality of the network. For instance, if ε ≤ 0.01, then,
following Theorem VII.3, if the misbehaving input take value in {u : 0.1 ≤ |u| ≤ 3}, then a misbehaving
agent is correctly detected and identified by a well-behaving agent.
IX. CONCLUSION
The problem of distributed reliable computation in networks with misbehaving nodes is considered,
and its relationship with the fault detection and isolation problem for linear systems is discussed. The
resilience of linear consensus networks to external attacks is characterized through some properties of
the underlying communication graph, as well as from a system-theoretic perspective. In almost any linear
consensus network, the misbehaving components can be correctly detected and identified, as long as the
connectivity of the communication graph is sufficiently high. Precisely, for a linear consensus network to
be resilient to k concurrent faults, the connectivity of the communication graph needs to be 2k + 1, if
Byzantine failures are allowed, and k+1, otherwise. Finally, for the faulty agents case, good performance
can be obtained even if the agents do not know the entire network topology, and they are subject to
memory or computation constraints.
Interesting aspects requiring further investigation include a characterization of the gain between the
inputs of a set of misbehaving agents and the observations of an agent j. Depending on the magnitude of
such gain, some undetectable behaviors may not be feasible for a set of misbehaving agents. The resilience
properties of specific consensus protocols, e.g., those resulting from an optimization process, should also
be studied. Finally, the clustering of a large network into smaller parts is crucial for the performance of
the proposed local identification procedure, and it requires additional research.
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